Drake,
“Broken record. I'll bother exactly one more time, despite you ignoring the vast majority of my last description of the situation. Chinese rockets were not that unreliable. Here's the full history, and even if they went from 50% reliable to 100%, how does that possibly affect US security? Only 7 of our cities get nuked instead of 14?”The vast majority of your comments were unremarkable, but at least you are asking the right question in the above paragraph. No, prior to Loral’s input, 1992-1996, the “Long March” launch booster record was dismal. :
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_March_(rocket_family)#Return_to_successSubsequent to 1996-2006, the Chinese had 75 consecutive successful launches with this missile. That is a problem, apparently you agree,
“Not to mention, again, that the improvement of Chinese rocket reliability was ILLEGAL. If a US company transfers tech to China illegally under Trump, are you going to blame him for that? I wouldn't.”Yes, they are illegal, which is why it was utterly treasonous to put the Department of Commerce in charge of licensure. Yes, if Trump did something that stupid, I would “blame him”.
“As for moving departments around, it makes far more sense for the commerce department to oversee, well, COMMERCIAL ventures.“You know how I will respond to that.
“Go ahead and cite for me the part of the Cox report that draws damning conclusions about this nefarious bureaucratic move.“I am not going to read all 930 pages, but here is the relevant summary (Emphasis mine):
“Satellite Launches
15. Implementation of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999
The Select Committee expects that the Executive branch will aggressively implement the Satellite Export Control Provisions of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999.
16.
State Department Should Have Sole Satellite Licensing AuthorityTo protect the national security, the congressional judgment that the Department of State is the appropriate agency for licensing both exports of satellites and any satellite launch failure investigations must be faithfully and fully implemented.17. StateDepartmentNeedforAdequatePersonnelandResourcesforSatellite Export Licensing
To protect the national interest in foreign commerce, the Satellite Launches
15. Implementation of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999
The Select Committee expects that the Executive branch will aggressively implement the Satellite Export Control Provisions of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999.
16. State Department Should Have Sole Satellite Licensing Authority
To protect the national security, the congressional judgment that the Department of State is the appropriate agency for licensing both exports of satellites and any satellite launch failure investigations must be faithfully and fully implemented.
17. StateDepartmentNeedforAdequatePersonnelandResourcesforSatellite Export Licensing
To protect the national interest in foreign commerce, the Department of State must ensure, consistent with national security, that satellite export licenses and notices to Congress are acted on in a timely fashion and that exporters are informed about the progress of their applications and have access to appropriate dispute resolution pro- cedures. In order to achieve the foregoing, the Executive branch and the Congress should ensure that the Department of State has adequate personnel and resources devoted to processing export license applications.
18. CorrectiveTaxLegislationforSatelliteExports
To ensure that satellite manufacturers are not disadvantaged in such collateral areas as tax credits by the transfer to the State Department of responsibility to license satellite exports, the appropriate congressional committees should report necessary legislation.
19. HeightenedRequirementsforDefenseDepartmentMonitoringofForeign Launches
The Department of Defense must give high priority to its obligations under the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, including requirements for (i) recruit-
SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RECOMMENDATIONS
ing, training, and maintaining a staff dedicated to monitoring launches in foreign countries of U.S. satellites; and (ii) establishing and monitoring technology control plans to prevent any transfer of information that could be used by the PRC to improve its missile launch capabilities.
20. Defense Department, Not Satellite Firms, Should Be Responsible for Security at Foreign Launches
The Select Committee recommends that the appropriate congressional committees report legislation providing that, in connection with foreign launches of U.S. satellites, the Department of Defense shall contract for security personnel who have undergone back- ground checks to verify their loyalty and reliability. The number of guards shall be suf- ficient to maintain 24-hour security of the satellite and all related missile and other sensi- tive technology. The satellite export licensee shall, as a condition of licensure, be required to reimburse the Department of Defense for all associated costs of such security.
21. NeedforAdequateandPermanentForceofWellTrainedDefense Department Monitors
The Department of Defense shall ensure sufficient training for space launch campaign monitors and the assignment of adequate numbers of monitors to space launch cam- paigns. The Department of Defense also shall ensure continuity of service by moni- tors for the entire space launch campaign period, from satellite marketing to launch, and, if necessary, completion of a launch failure analysis. In addition, the Department of Defense shall adopt measures to make service as a monitor an attractive career opportunity.
22. NeedforFullandTimelyReportingofTechnologyPassedtoPRC,andof Foreign Launch Security Violations
The Department of Defense monitors shall maintain logs of all information autho- rized for transmission to the PRC, including copies of any documents authorized for transmittal, and reports on launch-related activities. Such information shall be trans- mitted on a current basis to the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and to the Central Intelligence Agency. Such documents shall be retained for at least the
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period of the statute of limitations for violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). In addition, the Department of Defense shall adopt clear written guidelines providing monitors the responsibility and the ability to report serious secu- rity violations, problems, and issues at the overseas launch site directly to the head- quarters office of the responsible Defense Department agency.
23. Application of Export Control Laws to Space Launch Insurers
The Select Committee recommends that relevant Executive departments and agencies ensure that the laws and regulations establishing and implementing export controls are applied in full to communications among satellite manufacturers, purchasers, and the insurance industry, including communications after launch failures.
24. Expansion of U.S. Launch Capacity in National Security Interest
In light of the impact on U.S. national security of insufficient domestic, commercial space-launch capacity and competition, the Select Committee recommends that appropriate congressional committees report legislation to encourage and stimulate further the expansion of such capacity and competition.High Performance Computers
The Select Committee supports the sale of computers to the PRC for commercial but appropriate dispute resolution pro- cedures. In order to achieve the foregoing, the Executive branch and the Congress should ensure that the Department of State has adequate personnel and resources devoted to processing export license applications.
18. CorrectiveTaxLegislationforSatelliteExports
To ensure that satellite manufacturers are not disadvantaged in such collateral areas as tax credits by the transfer to the State Department of responsibility to license satellite exports, the appropriate congressional committees should report necessary legislation.
19.
20.
Defense Department, Not Satellite Firms, Should Be Responsible for Security at Foreign Launches
The Select Committee recommends that the appropriate congressional committees report legislation providing that, in connection with foreign launches of U.S. satellites, the Department of Defense shall contract for security personnel who have undergone back- ground checks to verify their loyalty and reliability. The number of guards shall be suf- ficient to maintain 24-hour security of the satellite and all related missile and other sensi- tive technology. The satellite export licensee shall, as a condition of licensure, be required to reimburse the Department of Defense for all associated costs of such security.
21. NeedforAdequateandPermanentForceofWellTrainedDefense Department MonitorsThe Department of Defense shall ensure sufficient training for space launch campaign monitors and the assignment of adequate numbers of monitors to space launch cam- paigns. The Department of Defense also shall ensure continuity of service by moni- tors for the entire space launch campaign period, from satellite marketing to launch, and, if necessary, completion of a launch failure analysis. In addition, the Department of Defense shall adopt measures to make service as a monitor an attractive career opportunity.
22.
NeedforFullandTimelyReportingofTechnologyPassedtoPRC,andof Foreign Launch Security Violations
The Department of Defense monitors shall maintain logs of all information autho- rized for transmission to the PRC, including copies of any documents authorized for transmittal, and reports on launch-related activities. Such information shall be trans- mitted on a current basis to the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and to the Central Intelligence Agency. Such documents shall be retained for at least the
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period of the statute of limitations for violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). In addition, the Department of Defense shall adopt clear written guidelines providing monitors the responsibility and the ability to report serious secu- rity violations, problems, and issues at the overseas launch site directly to the head- quarters office of the responsible Defense Department agency.
23. Application of Export Control Laws to Space Launch Insurers
The Select Committee recommends that relevant Executive departments and agencies ensure that the laws and regulations establishing and implementing export controls are applied in full to communications among satellite manufacturers, purchasers, and the insurance industry, including communications after launch failures.
24.
Expansion of U.S. Launch Capacity in National Security Interest
In light of the impact on U.S. national security of insufficient domestic, commercial space-launch capacity and competition, the Select Committee recommends that appropriate congressional committees report legislation to encourage and stimulate further the expansion of such capacity and competition.““Why did it change back, gee, do you think it might have been because the Cox report recommended it?“Are you reading your citation correctly? I have already told you, it ”changed back” to State Department licensure authority to enable adequate monitoring of national security concerns. I see nothing in the Cox report that you should take comfort in. It is a catalogue of Clinton screw ups.
“All that reads like "mistake" not Chinese Collusion to destroy America. As for the intelligence photo, I'm not qualified to make a determination about exactly what was revealed, or how important it was. This guy doesn't seem to think it was such a hot idea.”Mistake? Where was the mistake? Clinton got exactly what he wanted. The “collusion” was between Bill, and Loral, to the benefit of Chinese ICBM reliability.
So, your final characterization of the 10cm optical resolution differential issue is; not “such a hot idea”.?
Why did you even bother with the matter of Trump’s alleged breach of national security? Clinton’s cluster screwup ultimately resulted in Iran’s ICBM program, and you started our exchange by claiming that mere exportation of “rocket” technology bothered you.