Uh... When was the last time you looked at what the various defense think-tanks and DOD has been putting out there?
Not this crap again. OK, I call. Show your defense think tanks and DOD estimates.
I didn't bookmark it, I know I've seen it, I know generally where to look to find it. But it is not proving to be as easy to find as I'd hoped.
This gets close to what I was looking for, and might even be the launching pad for what I'm talking about:
https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.htmlIn a Taiwan invasion scenario, any help that's going to be sent in basically has hours to get into Taiwan before the risk starts to become unacceptable. After that, it will likely be weeks before the United States could regain air supremacy over the region, and that still doesn't address the matter of China's missile defense umbrella which extends well beyond Taiwan already.
Explain your invasion of Taiwan.
Just going from the RAND scorecard linked above ("closer to Taiwan" scenario;
2017):
China has an advantage on attacking US Air Bases within "Easy strike range of China" (because they're also in easy strike range
from China)
China was deemed to be
at parity with US Forces in "the Taiwan scenario" in 2017 when it came to Air Superiority.
China was deemed by Rand to have an advantage in ASW near Taiwan, not sure I believe that one. But they're claiming it.
They go into other fields where again they're scored as near parity for the most part.
And poking around a little more, the sub-article on Air Superiority seems to be very close to what I was looking for:
...As shown in the light-shaded bars, only two U.S. wings would have been required in theater to maintain 24/7 air dominance from the outset of a conflict over Taiwan in 1996. By 2010, improvements in Chinese air forces and missile capabilities increase this requirement to between nine and 20 wings (depending on how far away U.S. forces must be based). The higher requirement exceeds the total number of U.S. fighter wings, and basing within range of operational areas would almost certainly have been insufficient to support even the smaller number (especially given the significant requirements for tanker basing). By 2010, achieving 24/7 air dominance at the outset of a conflict was, and remains, unsustainable.
The United States would have better prospects of prevailing in an attrition campaign designed to defeat a Chinese air offensive over time. Nevertheless, PLA Air Force modernization has made such a campaign more challenging. ... Even in the attrition case, the United States would face increasing difficulty meeting its objectives in 2017, as more aircraft would be required, and there would be fewer bases to offer safety from Chinese missiles.
The results should be understood in context. China cannot achieve air superiority in any of these cases, and U.S. fighters achieve high kill ratios throughout. Relaxing the 21-day time requirement would reduce U.S. in-theater force requirements to levels that might be supported more easily by the available basing infrastructure. However, until U.S. forces achieve air superiority, the PLA air forces would largely have a free hand in attacking targets in Taiwan. A ground campaign in Taiwan would likely be decided relatively quickly, and the inability of U.S. air forces to achieve air superiority during that time would deprive U.S. and friendly forces of much-needed air support.
That was RAND speaking on conditions in 2017. China has continued to greatly expand its capabilities in the interim.
There are two scenarios. First, China takes a month to get everything ready. Troops are moved to staging areas. All the supplies they need for a cross strait invasion are prepared and stockpiled. The ships they need are all at embarkation points. The planes are armed and finally air defense patrols around Chinese airfields and ports are stepped up. All this we can see. All this we can hear about. All this gives time for the US, Japan, and Australia to mobilize and get things in place.
But our putting troops on Taiwan would itself be considered an act of War. China has been very vocal about that, they will go to war if the United States has a US Navy ship so much as tie up to a pier in Taiwan. Landing a combat brigade in Taiwan is likely to be received just as warmly. So if you're trying to get China to back down, you might have forces on high alert to deploy, but they cannot be in Taiwan until China starts to move on Taiwan.
Scenario 2: China goes for a surprise attack to knock out as much air defense and naval forces around Taiwan with ballistic missile attacks. They can do that quickly without getting everything else ready. They can knock out some of Taiwan's air defenses and navy with a surprise attack. Flip side is Taiwan has been ready for this for 50 years. All their hangers are hardened. Their aviation fuel underground. Some of their hangers are built into the sides of mountains. The air defense is mobile, how is China going to get all of them? Blanket the entire island. Even with their 2000+ ballistic missiles, they couldn't do it.
In a pinch, just cratering the runway will do. Gravel and jet aircraft don't mix well. And even Guam is within the estimated range of attack by the DF-26, so there are considerable first/second strike options for China against the US should it declare it is getting directly involved. So assuming that Guam and Okinawa don't get hit in a first strike by China at the onset, the Untied States may only have use of those airfields for part of a day before China potentially knocks them out of service for a few days(anything that lands there won't be taking off again until repairs complete).
Then, you have to establish air superiority over Taiwan. You're still going to have to deal with hundreds of ROC fighters and their SAMS. But China could eventually wear the ROC down if they are alone.
China has thousands of aircraft, and they have anti-air missiles that have range sufficient to target aircraft over Taiwan from the mainland. Granted, missiles used on the ROC fighters are missiles that can't be used against US Aircraft later on. But China has enough missiles that even if they're using multiple missiles per ROC fighter shot down, they'll have plenty left over for when the Americans turn up.
But then you have to cross the straight with your invasion force. The ROC army will be waiting on the beaches. There are only so many beaches on Taiwan that are capable of landing on. They can also launch an airborne attack, but the PLAs airborne forces are not large enough to do the job alone. You have to land on the beaches. Then they're going to be slogging against ROC troops for a week to months.
Not going to disagree, the ROC should be a tough nut for them to crack open, but the ROC can't defend
every potential beach head, and if they've lost aerial supremacy(if only in select places), holding the beaches becomes that much more of a challenge.
If the PLA launches a surprise attack, it's still going to take weeks to get the PLA in position with the supplies they need to sustain an invasion force. If they don't go for surprise, then we've already had time to move forces into the area. Now they have to deal with additional naval forces from Australia and Japan. Additional fighter and bomber attacks from Australia and Japan. Maybe the UK and Canada decide to fight with Australia. Maybe the US comes in. Chinese naval forces will be attrited and cross strait supply and troop movement will become hazardous for the PLA. If the USA comes in with 2 carrier groups and F-35s from Guam and Okinawa, Chinese air bases and ports will become targets. The invasion will be non-sustainable.
I'm not going to disagree, but it will be a war of attrition from the onset. The Good news for Taiwan is that if the US is involved the reality is
nobody will be likely to control the skies over Taiwan for any meaningful length of time for several weeks, which gives the defender a huge advantage. But getting to the point where the United Sates can devote air power to removing Chinese Amphibious assault capabilities is still likely to take weeks.
The bad news for Taiwan is China's military hubris and confidence in their gear and available technology may lead them to believe they're far more capable than they actually are.
If the Americans expect to take the better part of a month getting to Taiwan as their best case once China initiates hostilities(Airfields are currently the limiting factor, China can put more planes in the air in the region with shorter turn-around times than the US + Allies can).
If China takes the long buildup scenario, allies will probably already be in the area, including the US.
Airfields aren't exactly something which can be built overnight, especially for the aircraft in the Jet Age of aviation. And there are wild-cards in the mix. There is no guarantee that the Philippines will stick its neck out for Taiwan, even if the US is involved. There is no assurance that South Korea would get involved either. If they "don't play," then those potential bases are off the table, so that means fewer planes on station at any given time as they spend more time in transit instead(and wracking up massive flight hours which triggers maintenance needs as well).
Australia, Japan, and the Philippines have enough naval forces and can project just enough air defense to keep the strait too dangerous to cross. That makes the invasion unsustainable. That's all they have to do. They don't have to land troops. They just need to make it impossible for China to stay.
Their air defenses don't help them much if they're put up against some of the stuff that was designed to counter the US Navy, the only counter the United States has for that is basically THAAD and/or other anti-satellite capabilities that none of those nations are believed to have. Getting near Taiwan may make things dangerous for Chinese ships, but it makes things far more dangerous for the ships of Japan and Australia. As to the Philippines, their Navy is barely adequate for self-defense, they may have the range to reach Taiwan, but the capabilities they bring to table basically consist of providing more things for China to shoot at. Most of their stuff is badly out of date... Which puts them about on par with the older ships of the PLAN.
It's all a matter of range. US carrier groups can sit back far enough from Chinese airfields so that if their bombers came for them, they would do so without fighter support and be running into a literal nest of Hornets. After you attrit their bomber forces, you can move in closer and go after establishing air superiority over Taiwan, allowing strike packages to hit the PLA forces landed on the island, their airheads, their beacheads, strangle their supply lines, strike their C2 capabilities. F35s can basically sneak up from wherever and bushwack PLA CAP. You attrit their fighter forces. Then you send in B-21s to hit PLA supply points and infrastructure. Sure, it will take weeks.
B-21's won't be doing anything if China moves this year. But I'd also strongly suspect that for the opening portion of hostilities, no Carrier will be getting closer than 2,000 miles from Taiwan to start with. They might creep in as close as 1,500 miles but that's going to be about their limit until they get a better picture of exactly what China's capabilities are, and where China's stuff is either known to be at, or where they're known to not be present at. Roughly 2,000 miles out is where the carrier aircraft can at least lob some air-launched cruise-missiles at Chinese forces. If we can get some tankers in the air they even escort the tanker's in to aound the 1,000 mile point, refuel and move in closer to Chinese forces. But as the navy has no Carrier-launched tankers in service at present(a drone is in development though), they'd be relying on the Air-Force for that... Or using Super-hornets doing the "buddy tanker" thing which would reduce available combat craft by anywhere from half to even a third(1 buddy to get them out, another buddy to get them back) of normal capabilities.
Yes there should be "warning signs" and indicators that something is going on, but some of those things are going to be much harder to detect than others. And given China's close proximity to Taiwan, a lot of that may not be noticeable until just days or just a week or so before they pull the proverbial trigger. In other words, China will be invading while the US and allies are still working out the logistics of the detailed response(and that's with a contingency plan in the first place).
But that's what the US has contingency plans for. It means the response force in Japan goes on high alert and start loading on planes the moment they have confirmation China is attacking. Get those guys over there ASAP and hope they can help Taiwan hold on until we can get more help on the way.
Chinese DF-26s are only a problem if and when they know where our carriers are. They can't just shoot them into the Pacific and hope for a lucky hit.
Fully agreed, they're only as good as "the kill chain" allows, which means they need to have "eyeballs on the carrier," otherwise they're just firing blindly into the sea. But "eyeballs on the sea" take a great many forms, and given the PLAN's "militia" of fishing boats, among other such things, that is a major counter-intelligence problem. How do you know that fishing trawler is really from the nation the flag they're flying indicates? Granted wartime in that scenario, and most of the "allied nations" would likely be granting permissions on that front. No civilian boat is going to be able to be allowed to come anywhere close to somewhere an Aircraft Carrier is operating. Of course, that creates it's own of intelligence boon, just look for the Carriers where-ever the exclusions zones are found to be.
Land conquest of Taiwan would take 2-3 weeks at a minimum from landing, if the PLA gets lucky and don't get massacred on beaches and dropzones. It's basically the exact opposite for a fait accompli. Whatever the PLA has left on Taiwan is going to be vulnerable and as I stated before, you don't even have to invade, you just have to make it impossible for the PLA to stay on Taiwan.
But at what cost to the people of Taiwan. I do agree that a lot could be achieved simply by cutting off China's ability to supply their forces on Taiwan and sending some forces ashore to limit their ability to "resupply locally" but there are millions of Taiwanese citizens who then find themselves caught in that cross fire as the United States potentially destroys the infrastructure of Taiwan in order to save the nation... Which won't be much of a nation after that.
