On what basis can you judge this "sense"? Surely we can expect that people who disagree with you will also say they have this same "sense". So whose is right? If you want to speak of 'closer' to the truth, closer on what basis? On what standard? These are all tough questions, but here we are addressing the position that religious people should have to adhere to certain precepts whether or not they agree with them. So we're not just speaking of some ethereal 'closer' to the truth, but rather looking at a case where these 'religious people' are being told flat-out that they are wrong, and not only so, but that they will be obliged to ignore their own sense of right and wrong. At this point feeling vaguely like you have a 'better sense' than the next guy doesn't cut it - not when you're trying to force him to conform to your view. You'd better have an iron-clad case to make when you're going to employ force to coerce someone else's cooperation.
It is much the same with all governance issues, including taxation and the sort. This one particularly "touchy" because religion is involved, however as with all things under a governing authority there is a need for some sort of social compact whereby we can, in fact, tell each other "you are compelled to behave a certain way". In the baker's case, if you want to run a bakery, you will be expected to serve all clients regardless of their inborn characteristics (neglecting, for a moment, the case of the rude customer). Nobody compels one to run a bakery, but one can assert authority over
how it shall be run for the benefit of the broader society, including regulations related to public health/hygiene and such. Most of these are non-controversial items, of course.
The particulars of the bakery are interesting to me. I would not, for example, wish to compel a priest to perform a gay wedding ceremony, since the function is clearly a specialized religious one and not the producing of a simple good. With the bakery/gay wedding cake scenario, it is an instance of the public authority not only setting out the rules of the marketplace while effectively telling the baker that their religious objection is invalid. I can see why this is controversial, of course, but it is inevitable that some religious beliefs would conflict with the authority's understanding of the common good. We see this with the care of children routinely now, whereby medical emergencies can overrule a J Witness's beliefs about giving medicine to their child. It will never cease to be a controversy, but I do tend to think there is such a common good being served that is more important than any one person's beliefs.
In this context I was still speaking within the context of moral realism, in which case it would be objectively untrue that morality is a human construct.
Let me clarify - when I say "human construct" I did not mean to imply that moral truth was invented by humans. Merely that it can only be judged and evaluated by humans (well, sentient beings, to be inclusive). This is consistent with moral realism. In fact, having looked it up, my views parallel what is called "ethical non-naturalism", whereby the following can be said:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_non-naturalism1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion.
4. These moral features of the world are not reducible to any set of non-moral features.
... read further into that entry, particularly when Moore sets out to describe "goodness". In this system, it is essentially an irreducible idea that humans can perceive and evaluate but is not derived from natural processes.
In such a system, let us suppose there was only one being in all of existence. Could this last remaining person (let us assume such) still comprehend "goodness"? I would suggest that they could, although there would be no context in which to apply it since there is no relational context with anybody else by which to explore it. My perception of "the good" is as a sort of universally understood concept but one that is only relevant in a world where beings must relate to each other. I misspoke when I said "human construct" - I meant to say "only matters among humans/sentients".
I don't have any reason to believe that moral knowledge is improving significantly, or at least that it has lately. I do think, though, that our understanding of structure and systems is improving, which in turn helps to unravel conflicts of interest. This is a problem with function, not with morals. If a person believes a true thing but is incentivized to do the opposite, you've got an unhealthy situation. When an institution dedicated to love and peace, for instance, is also in the position of having to maintain national defense, law, and order, you have a conflict of interest there where violence and peace must reside under the same roof. I do agree, therefore, that there is progress, most notably in disentangling things that ought not to be bound up together. For instance, once politics and money are completely disentangled things will be very different. That doesn't mean we currently lack a knowledge of what would be good, but in any case we are unable to realize that knowledge at present because the system doesn't allow for it. I would say, then, that what we are getting better at is making room for moral decisions, but that is an entirely different matter from suggesting we are also becoming wiser in the moral realm. On the contrary, I think people at present are probably far less wise morally than their ancestors were.
I can appreciate this distinction and see it as a helpful clarification - thanks.
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It'd be a fun sport.